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In his important article, When Erie Goes International, Professor
Childress addresses the marvelous question of the Erie doctrine’s
application in an international context.1 In particular, Childress argues that
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,2 which held that a
federal court sitting in diversity (or alienage) must borrow the choice of
law rules of the state where the federal court is located, should not apply
when the federal court chooses between state law and the law of a foreign
nation.3 In this Essay, I have three points to make in response—one
clarificatory and two critical.
The clarificatory point is that even if Childress is correct, the bulk of
the Erie doctrine applies unchanged in international cases. Childress’s
arguments are directed solely to Klaxon and international choice of law.
The first critical point concerns the merits of Childress’s arguments, all but
one of which give us no reason to think that Klaxon should be abandoned
in international cases. The one argument that has any success is that a
choice between state and foreign law implicates federal interests in foreign
relations, in particular comity with foreign nations. These federal interests
can indeed override Klaxon’s command. But this brings me to my second
critical point: Childress exaggerates the extent to which these federal
interests will displace Klaxon. Whereas he thinks that federal law will
preempt much—or perhaps all—state law on international choice of law, I
argue that preemption will be rare.
MOST OF ERIE STILL APPLIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT EVEN
IF CHILDRESS’S ARGUMENTS SUCCEED
Even if the arguments in Childress’s article succeed, their effect is
relatively narrow. Most of the Erie doctrine still applies in an international
context. To see why, consider an international Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.4
In the original Erie, Tompkins, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, was struck by
something protruding from one of Erie’s trains—probably an open door—
I.

1
2
3
4

Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531 (2011).
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Childress, supra note 1, at 1577–78.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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while trespassing on Erie’s property in Pennsylvania. He sued Erie, a
domiciliary of New York, in federal court in New York.5 For our
international Erie case, imagine that the accident had happened in Ontario,
Canada, or that Tompkins or Erie (or both) had been a domiciliary of
Ontario when the accident in Pennsylvania occurred.6
Erie stands, in part, for the principle that diversity jurisdiction does not
give a federal court the power to make federal common law that displaces
the state law right upon which the plaintiff sues.7 The scope of federal
courts’ power to make common law is a contested matter,8 but at the very
least it requires the presence of some federal regulatory interest, not just
jurisdiction.9 Childress concedes that this core constitutional principle of
Erie applies in international cases. He does not suggest that the federal
court entertaining our international Erie case would have the power to
make a federal common law rule governing Erie’s duty of care to
Tompkins merely because one or both of the parties is a foreign
domiciliary or because the event being litigated occurred abroad.10 His
point is solely that federal law should govern the choice between state and
foreign law.
Erie also stands for a principle of interpretive fidelity. It was not
enough that the federal court in Erie applied Pennsylvania law. It had to
defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretations of that law.11
5

Id. at 69.
If Erie Railroad or Tompkins were a foreign domiciliary, the source of federal subject matter
jurisdiction would be alienage rather than diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006). If both were foreign
domiciliaries, there might be federal subject matter jurisdiction, provided the case were joined to what
was otherwise a diversity case, id. § 1332(a)(3), or to a federal question action in a manner that gave it
supplemental jurisdiction, id. § 1367.
7
See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (stating that a
principle of Erie is that the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction does not give federal courts the
power to develop a “concomitant body of general federal law”); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 915–23 (1986) (“[T]he firm holding
of Erie is that the existence of diversity jurisdiction does not provide a basis for making federal
common law.”); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1244 (2011) (“Under Erie, federal courts do not possess lawmaking power by
virtue of having subject matter jurisdiction.”). In fact, this Erie principle applies beyond diversity (and
alienage) jurisdiction to other circumstances in which a federal court can get jurisdiction over a state
law action, such as supplemental jurisdiction or bankruptcy. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,
55 (1979); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 663–78
(2004).
8
Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1985) (tying federal common lawmaking powers closely to the specific intentions of Congress), with
Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989) (finding power to create
federal common law wherever there is a legitimate national governmental interest).
9
E.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
10
Childress, supra note 1, at 1568, 1577–78.
11
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). For a discussion of whether the constitutional
duty to defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the content of Pennsylvania law would
6
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Furthermore, if Pennsylvania law was unsettled, in the sense that no
relevant Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions existed, it had to predict
what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision would be.12 Once again,
Childress’s article does not cast doubt upon the applicability of this
principle in international cases. If the court in our international Erie case
applies Ontario law, it apparently has an obligation to defer to the decisions
of the Court of Appeal for Ontario and, if the matter is unsettled, predict
the Court of Appeal’s likely decision.13
Under Erie, jurisdiction is insufficient to give federal courts the power
to create federal common law that displaces the state law right upon which
the plaintiff sues. But that does not mean that federal courts sitting in
diversity do not have the power to create procedural common law—that is,
federal common law that regulates the means by which substantive rights
are litigated in the federal court system.14 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has articulated another Erie principle restricting federal courts’ power in
this area. When entertaining state law actions, they are constrained by the
“twin aims of the Erie rule”: discouraging forum shopping between state
and federal courts and avoiding the inequitable administration of the laws.15
Unlike the first two Erie principles, which are generally understood as
constitutionally compelled,16 the twin aims probably have a statutory
source.17

exist if that court did not want federal courts to give it deference, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111 (2011).
12
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). For a discussion of this obligation,
see Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism
After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495–1517 (1997); Green, supra note 7, at 1237–51.
13
Let me be clear that I am not necessarily endorsing the view that these Erie principles apply in
international cases. I have expressed doubt about whether a federal court applying the law of a foreign
nation has the same duties of interpretive fidelity that Erie puts upon federal courts when interpreting
state law. Green, supra note 7, at 1260–61 n.110. Furthermore, just what interpretive fidelity amounts to
in connection with a foreign civil law jurisdiction is a difficult issue. Because the decisions by the
highest court of appeals in such a jurisdiction are not binding upon lower courts in subsequent cases, it
is not clear that the predictive method is appropriate. For an argument that federal courts should use the
predictive method for Louisiana law, even though Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, see Green, supra
note 11, at 1147 n.155. My current goal, however, is not to discuss whether Childress’s assumptions are
correct but solely to identify the scope of his argument.
14
Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law
is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846–78 (2008).
15
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). For a discussion of the twin aims, see Michael
Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865 (forthcoming 2013).
16
See Green, supra note 7, at 1243–44.
17
Childress agrees with the characterization of the twin aims as nonconstitutional in origin.
Childress, supra note 1, at 1543. Most argue that the statutory source of the twin aims is the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). E.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV.
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Because of the twin aims, federal courts entertaining state law actions
are often obligated to borrow procedural law from the courts of the forum
state, since disuniformity would generate forum shopping and inequity. But
the twin aims are not dispositive. Even if the difference between a federal
common law procedural rule and the forum state’s law would frustrate the
twin aims, the federal rule can still be used if there are “countervailing”
federal interests in its favor.18
Nothing in Childress’s article casts doubt upon the applicability of the
twin aims to international cases. For example, he would surely agree that
Guaranty Trust v. York remains unchanged.19 The federal court entertaining
our international Erie case could not craft its own common law limit on the
amount of time Tompkins could wait before suing Erie. The reason is
simple: a federal time limit that differed from the forum state’s statute of
limitations would result in forum shopping and inequity, and no
countervailing federal interests in favor of a uniform federal limit exist.
Childress’s assumption that the twin aims apply in international cases
is evident in his discussion of forum non conveniens. Since federal forum
non conveniens doctrine is judge created, the twin aims limit federal
courts’ ability to use it in diversity cases. “[I]t is arguable,” Childress
observes, “that [forum non conveniens] doctrine should be governed by
state law in federal diversity actions.”20 To be sure, federal courts
addressing this question have generally held that federal standards should
be used.21 But this is because countervailing federal interests have
overcome the twin aims, not because the twin aims fail to apply at all.22
That the twin aims apply in an international context is no small matter,
for it means that countless procedural issues faced by federal courts in
international cases will be governed by standards borrowed from the forum
state. Some examples are: the tolling of statutes of limitations;23
preconditions for bringing suit (such as posting a bond,24 filing a certificate
of merit,25 and submitting the dispute to arbitration26 or mediation27); the
L. REV. 693, 722–23 (1974). For an argument that the twin aims have their source not in the Rules of
Decision Act but in the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction, see Green, supra note 15.
18
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 431–32 (1996).
19
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
20
Childress, supra note 1, at 1564.
21
Id.
22
See, e.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).
23
See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
24
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
25
See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000).
26
See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609
F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979).
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availability of attorney’s fees if an offer of settlement is refused;28 hearings
for a settlement involving a minor;29 the validity of forum selection
clauses;30 and methods of calculating attorney’s fees,31 exchange rates,32 and
prejudgment interest.33 In none of these instances would Childress’s
argument apply. His argument is solely that choice of law rules should not
be borrowed from the forum state in international cases.
Yet another Erie principle concerns the applicability of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in diversity cases. Here the twin aims are irrelevant. The
fact that the difference between the Federal Rule and forum state law
results in forum shopping and inequity does not mean the Federal Rule
cannot be applied. A Federal Rule’s validity depends solely upon two
considerations: whether it is within Congress’s power to regulate the
procedure of federal courts34 and whether it satisfies the limitations in the
Rules Enabling Act35—in which Congress delegated its regulatory power to
the Supreme Court.36 The most significant limitation in the Act is that a
Federal Rule must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”37
Professor Childress gives us no reason to think that the Rules Enabling
Act’s substantive right limitation does not apply in an international context.
The fact that a Federal Rule abridges, enlarges, or modifies a foreign
substantive right would apparently be as problematic as the fact that it
abridges, enlarges, or modifies a state (or federal) substantive right.38
In the end, Childress’s argument is focused on only one aspect of the
Erie doctrine: Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., which
held that a federal court should borrow the choice of law rules of the state

27

See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011).
29
See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001).
30
See Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2007).
31
See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995).
32
See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
33
See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764 (1st Cir. 1994).
34
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (power extends to matters “rationally capable of
classification” as substance or procedure).
35
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
36
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, 469–74.
37
§ 2072(b). For a recent discussion of the substantive right provision of the Act, see Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (reading the provision as requiring only that the Federal Rule “really regulates procedure”); id.
at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the provision
means that a Federal Rule “cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law
that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right”); and id. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(accepting Justice Stevens’s reading).
38
Once again, I am not necessarily endorsing this position. It is possible that the substantive rights
provision of the Rules Enabling Act was not meant by Congress to apply to foreign rights.
28
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where the federal court is located.39 As Childress rightly notes, Klaxon was
motivated by the twin aims.40 If federal courts came up with their own
choice of law rules, the resulting disuniformity with the rules of the forum
state would generate both vertical forum shopping (between state and
federal courts) and inequity.41 Childress argues, however, that when the
choice is between state law and the law of a foreign nation, federal
common law choice of law rules should be used.
An example is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,42 in which a
federal court in New York had to determine whether the Cuban
government’s expropriation of a U.S. company’s assets should be denied
effect. Because the expropriation was valid under Cuban law, this was a
choice of law issue—whether Cuban or state (presumably New York) law
ought to apply.43 Although it appeared that New York’s choice of law rules
would have chosen Cuban law anyway, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the matter was governed by the federal act of state doctrine, which
mandated the application of Cuban law. Klaxon was irrelevant.
Notice that insofar as he uses Sabbatino as his model, Childress’s
argument is not that federal choice of law rules should be used in federal
court only. Rather, they should supplant state rules in both federal and state
court,44 since the act of state doctrine articulated in Sabbatino applies in
both fora.45
II. ALL BUT ONE OF CHILDRESS’S ARGUMENTS FAIL TO MEET
THEIR MARK
Now for the first of two critical points: Professor Childress offers four
main arguments in favor of federalizing international choice of law, but
only one has any success.
39

313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Childress, supra note 1, at 1559.
41
As Justice Reed put it, if federal courts had different choice of law rules from the forum state,
“the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.” Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
42
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
43
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S.
398.
44
Childress’s emphasis on Sabbatino suggests that the federal choice of law rules for international
conflicts should be binding upon state courts. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 1, at 1567 (quoting
favorably Louis Henkin’s statement that “[i]nternational conflicts, then, may raise federal questions on
which states do not call the tune but must follow the federal lead” (alteration in original)); id. at 1573
(stating that a “reconsideration of the Erie doctrine as applied in private international law cases is in
order because where principles of international comity apply as a matter of federal law, they provide ‘a
principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike’” (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427)).
But at one point he hedges his bets, stating that “[f]ederal common law for conflicts cases could be
developed as federal common law, which would be binding on the states like the act of state doctrine, or
as procedural federal common law, which would not be binding on the states.” Id. at 1574 n.320.
45
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424–26; see Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1249 (Haw. 1998).
40
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A. Horizontal Forum Shopping
One of Childress’s unsuccessful arguments rests upon the entirely
accurate observation that the difference between states’ choice of law rules
generates horizontal forum shopping between courts in different states.46
Assume that a California plaintiff injured in Germany by a product made
by a California company in California finds German rather than California
law to his benefit. A court in California, using its comparative impairment
approach to choice of law,47 would apply California law. But the plaintiff
can still get German law by suing in Virginia, which uses the old-fashioned
choice of law approach, exemplified in the First Restatement,48 under
which the law of the place of the harm applies.49
Childress argues that this horizontal forum shopping is a reason to
question whether Klaxon should apply in international cases.50 Because
Klaxon demands that federal courts use the forum state’s choice of law
rules, it solves the problem of vertical forum shopping between federal and
state courts only by encouraging horizontal forum shopping between
federal courts.
But horizontal forum shopping is not a reason to abandon Klaxon in
international cases. Justice Reed was quite explicit in his opinion in Klaxon
that horizontal forum shopping, no matter how prevalent, was not the
Court’s concern: “Whatever lack of uniformity [the Klaxon rule] may
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our
federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its
neighbors.”51 Childress suggests that vertical forum shopping was
emphasized in Klaxon only because the Court thought it was a more serious
problem than the horizontal version,52 but Justice Reed’s opinion makes it
clear that this is not the case.
Furthermore, if discouraging horizontal forum shopping between
federal courts were a concern, Klaxon would be undermined entirely, not
just in cases involving international choice of law.53 Childress offers no
46

Childress, supra note 1, at 1560.
See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279
(2009).
48
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934).
49
Symeonides, supra note 47.
50
Childress, supra note 1, at 1559–60.
51
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
52
Childress, supra note 1, at 1559.
53
For criticisms of Klaxon for generating horizontal forum shopping, see, for example, Patrick J.
Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29,
32 (2010), and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 38 (1986).
47
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evidence that horizontal forum shopping is more of a problem when the
choice is between the laws of a state and a foreign nation than when it is
between the laws of two states. He therefore gives us no reason to think
that Klaxon should be rejected only in international cases.54
In addition to being too comprehensive (because it applies beyond
international cases), the argument from horizontal forum shopping is also
too narrow, for it does not suggest that international choice of law be
federalized in state court. Of course, we could imagine Childress insisting
that horizontal forum shopping between state courts should also be
discouraged. But I doubt that he wants to take such a stand, for the result
would be that a whole host of procedural issues faced by state courts would
be subject to uniform federal common law rules. Assume, for example, that
a plaintiff chooses state court in Virginia rather than California because he
likes Virginia’s longer statute of limitations. If avoiding such horizontal
forum shopping were a reason to extend federal law to state courts, a
uniform federal rule would preempt Virginia’s and California’s limitations
periods. Childress cannot think that is right.
B. The Rules of Decision Act
The most intriguing of Childress’s arguments for federalizing choice
of law in an international context relies upon the observation that the Rules
of Decision Act refers only to state and not to foreign law.55 The Act reads:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.56

The Act directs federal courts to apply the laws of the several states, not the
laws of foreign nations. Childress argues that, to the extent that Klaxon has
its source in the Act, it should not apply when a federal court is considering
whether foreign law should be used.
That the Rules of Decision Act does not refer to foreign law is a
marvelous insight and potentially of great importance in understanding the
Act’s purpose and scope. But it cannot justify an argument against Klaxon
in international cases. As Childress himself concedes,57 Klaxon probably

54

Childress argues that “[e]valuating whether these rationales are correct or even persuasive in the
domestic context is not my purpose here, for the federal courts do not question the continuing relevance
of Erie [and Klaxon] to their domestic analyses.” Childress, supra note 1, at 1555. But federal courts do
not question the continued relevance of Erie and Klaxon to their international analyses either. If
Childress’s argument against Klaxon convinced federal courts in an international context, it should
convince them in a domestic context as well.
55
Id. at 1555–57.
56
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (emphasis added).
57
Childress, supra note 1, at 1555.
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does not have its source in the Act.58 The Act ensures that federal courts
respect their preexisting constitutional obligation to use applicable state
law.59 For example, the Act compelled the federal court in Erie to apply
Pennsylvania law concerning Erie’s duty of care to Tompkins because
Pennsylvania law applied to the case and was not preempted by any federal
statute or common law rule.
Klaxon therefore cannot have its source in the Act, for a forum state’s
choice of law rules cannot apply—and do not purport to apply—to cases
faced by federal courts. Assume that in our international Erie case New
York choice of law rules would have selected Ontario rather than
Pennsylvania law. New York surely does not have the power to compel a
federal court in New York to choose Ontario law as well.60 Klaxon has its
source in the twin aims and not in the Rules of Decision Act. Federal courts
must borrow New York’s choice of law rules as a means of avoiding forum
shopping and inequity. Thus, the fact that federal courts’ obligations under
the Act do not extend to foreign law does not mean that the twin aims
cannot obligate a federal court to apply foreign law if the courts of the
forum state would do so.
Furthermore, even if one sets this problem aside, the argument is too
narrow; it addresses only federal courts’ obligations, since only their
obligations are addressed by the Act. No interpretation of the Act’s scope
can justify the displacement of state choice of law rules in state court.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Childress’s third unsuccessful argument for federalizing choice of law
in international cases is that using forum state choice of law rules
improperly “thrusts federal courts into undertaking forum non conveniens
analyses.”61 An important factor in favor of dismissal under forum non
conveniens is that the court must apply foreign law, particularly when the
content of that law is difficult or uncertain. Childress argues that in the
58

For an argument that the twin aims of Erie, and thus Klaxon, do not have their source in the Act,
see Green, supra note 15.
59
E.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“It directs federal courts to follow state laws only ‘in cases where they
apply,’ which federal courts would be required to do even in the absence of the Act.”).
60
In saying that a state’s choice of law rules cannot extend to federal courts within its borders, I set
aside the question of the extent to which a state’s choice of law rules might limit the territorial scope of
the state’s own causes of action wherever they are brought. For example, New York choice of law rules
might limit the territorial scope of New York causes of action when brought in federal or sister state
court. For the view that choice of law rules can generate such limits, see Larry Kramer, Return of the
Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005–08 (1991), and Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The
Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1884 (2005).
For a criticism, see Green, supra note 11, at 1162–67, and Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845 (2013).
61
Childress, supra note 1, at 1561.
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international context, Klaxon results in too many federal courts dismissing
actions on forum non conveniens grounds because the forum state’s choice
of law rules require them to apply foreign law. These dismissals, Childress
argues, can frustrate federal interests.62 The problem is particularly acute
for federal courts in states that accept the First Restatement, which can
require that foreign law be used simply because a triggering event (such as
the harm) occurred abroad, however minimal the foreign nation’s interests
actually are. As a solution, Childress suggests a federal choice of law
approach that is more sensitive to the interests of the relevant
jurisdictions.63
One virtue of this argument is that it can explain why federal choice of
law rules should apply in state as well as federal court. If state courts,
relying on their own choice of law rules, continued to dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds, federal interests would still be frustrated.64
But the argument is ultimately unsuccessful. Even if we assume that
the excessive number of dismissals frustrates federal interests, it remains
unclear why federalizing choice of law is the appropriate response. The
problem, after all, is wrongful dismissal, not the application of foreign law.
The most focused way of protecting federal interests, therefore, would be to
create a federal common law rule that limits a court’s ability to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds simply because foreign law applies.
This proposed federal rule would be very limited in its effect. First of
all, it would apply only when dismissal would frustrate federal interests.
Second, even when this new rule did apply, it would not preempt state
choice of law rules but would simply demand that the court not dismiss the
case on forum non conveniens grounds. If the court retained jurisdiction,
federal interests would be satisfied even if it ended up applying foreign
law. A court would have to change its choice of law approach only when it
concluded that the burden of applying foreign law was too great to retain
jurisdiction. Finally, the federal rule would impact all states’ choice of law
approaches, not merely those that follow the First Restatement. This
federal rule could just as easily force a court to give up its Second
Restatement approach if that approach recommended foreign over state
62

Some examples are when the foreign court will also refuse to entertain the action or an American
court must subsequently face the question of whether the foreign judgment should be enforced. Id. at
1562–65. Although I question whether federal interests are commonly implicated in such cases, I will
ignore the matter here.
63
Id. at 1574–76.
64
Childress offers another explanation of why courts are dismissing too often on forum non
conveniens grounds: they take the mere possibility that foreign law applies as a reason to dismiss,
without engaging in the choice of law analysis to determine whether the matter is really governed by
foreign law. Id. at 1565–66. But this criticism of courts does nothing to support federalizing
international choice of law. If courts are dismissing without engaging in the appropriate choice of law
analysis, the problem cannot be solved by changing the analysis. Courts will dismiss too often whatever
the choice of law rule is.
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law. Nothing in Childress’s argument suggests that state choice of law rules
should be preempted by a federal choice of law approach that is sensitive to
state interests.
Occasionally Childress argues against Klaxon applying in international
choice of law cases on the premise that “the application of foreign law,
unlike sister-state law, is entirely voluntary.”65 This is puzzling. Childress
cannot mean that an American court cannot be constitutionally obligated to
apply foreign law. As he is clearly aware, a court can be required by due
process to choose the law of a foreign nation over the law of a state.66
Indeed, to the extent that a court faces a choice of law decision at all—even
in an entirely domestic context—its choice to apply a particular
jurisdiction’s law must be voluntary in the sense that it is constitutionally
optional. For example, if a court uses its choice of law rules to determine
whether it should apply California or Virginia law, it cannot be the case
that it is constitutionally permitted to apply only one of those states’ laws.
Although Childress’s point here is unclear, my guess is that by saying that
the choice of foreign law is “voluntary,” he is arguing that the choice
implicates federal concerns about comity and international relations. If so,
it is connected to the argument I discuss in the next Part.
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE CHOICE OF LAW RULES DUE TO FEDERAL
INTERESTS IN FOREIGN RELATIONS WILL BE RARE
In the end, Childress’s best argument for federalizing international
choice of law does not have to do with forum shopping, the Rules of
Decision Act, or forum non conveniens. His best argument is this: unlike
the choice between the laws of two states, the choice between state and
foreign law can implicate federal interests in foreign relations, in particular
comity with foreign nations.67 As was the case in Sabbatino,68 these federal
interests can justify uniform federal choice of law rules applicable in both
federal and state courts.
Although Childress is clearly right on this point, I think he exaggerates
the extent to which displacement of state choice of law rules will occur.
Whereas Childress thinks that federal law will preempt much—or perhaps
all—state law on international choice of law, I doubt that preemption will
extend much further than cases like Sabbatino.
In general, a state’s choice of law rule will frustrate U.S. foreign
relations only when it recommends state law over foreign law. After all, it
is the refusal to apply foreign law that might offend the foreign nation,

65
66
67
68

Id. at 1534; see also id. at 1556.
Id. at 1549–54.
Id. at 1573–74.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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inspiring retaliation that would adversely affect American interests.69 That
was the case in Sabbatino, in which the federal act of state doctrine
recommended that Cuban rather than New York law govern the dispute.
The failure to apply Cuban law would have frustrated American foreign
relations.70 To be sure, federal interests might occasionally recommend the
application of state rather than foreign law. The failure of the foreign nation
to respect American law in similar circumstances in the past might make it
in the United States’ interest to retaliate by refusing to apply foreign law.
To the extent that state choice of law rules recommend foreign law, they
would be preempted by a uniform federal choice of law rule. But such
situations would be unusual.
It is odd, therefore, that Childress emphasizes as problematic those
cases in which state choice of law rules choose foreign law. He seems
primarily worried about states that use the First Restatement, which can
recommend foreign law without considering the interests of the relevant
jurisdictions.71 But the fact that a state’s choice of law rules are insensitive
to state (and foreign) interests does not, on its own, implicate any federal
interests that could justify federal choice of law rules.
Consider Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,72 which Childress
offers as a case where federal choice of law rules might be appropriate.73
Day was a product liability suit on behalf of two soldiers—one domiciled
in Wisconsin and the other in Tennessee—concerning a defective howitzer
round manufactured in Texas that injured them in Cambodia. The Supreme
Court held that the federal court in Texas entertaining the actions was
compelled by Klaxon to use Texas’s First Restatement choice of law
approach. As a result, the federal court probably had to use the law of
Cambodia, the jurisdiction in which the harm occurred.
Day is not a case in which federal interests recommend federalizing
choice of law. To be sure, such interests might justify the creation of a
substantive federal common law rule. Product liability suits against military
contractors can discourage them from doing business with the federal
government. There is a good argument, therefore, for a federal rule
prohibiting or limiting such actions. This substantive rule would preempt
all competing law—state and foreign—in a suit against a military

69

Technically, these federal foreign relations interests are not confined to cases in which an
American court chooses between foreign and state law. Cases in which the court chooses between the
laws of two foreign nations are also a concern. Furthermore, federal interests might even arise in cases
in which an American court is determining which of two states’ laws ought to apply because a foreign
nation might be offended by the application of one of the states’ laws to its domiciliary or to an event
within its borders.
70
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436–37.
71
Childress, supra note 1, at 1546–49.
72
423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
73
Childress, supra note 1, at 1548–49, 1565, 1569–79.
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contractor.74 But that is not Childress’s argument. He argues instead that
federal interests recommend a federal choice of law rule—which in Day
would choose Texas, Wisconsin, or Tennessee law—rather than
Cambodian law.75
It is unclear why federal interests would recommend such a rule. The
reason cannot be that Cambodia would be offended by the federal court’s
choice of law decision, for that would happen only when Cambodian law
was not chosen. Granted, if the United States had already adopted a policy
of retaliating against Cambodia for the failure of its courts to apply
American law, federal foreign policy interests would recommend that
American courts apply state law. But it is hard to see how even that unusual
scenario would apply in Day. Any retaliatory policy directed against the
Cambodian government would have been a waste of time—at the time Day
was decided Cambodia was being overrun by the Khmer Rouge.
The other possible federal interests, as we have seen, are the negative
consequences of frequent dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds.
Hamstrung by Klaxon into applying Cambodian law, the federal court
might refuse to take jurisdiction of the case. As we have seen, however,
there is a more restrained solution to the problem than a federal choice of
law rule—namely, a federal rule discouraging dismissal.
In his article, Childress has a tendency to endorse—under the guise of
vindicating federal foreign policy interests—a federal choice of law rule
that is sensitive to state interests.76 He does not explain, however, why
insensitivity to state interests harms the federal government. For this
reason, he has given us little reason to believe that federal preemption of
state choice of law rules would occur with any regularity.
It is possible, however, that Professor Childress is not really
recommending that a uniform federal choice of law rule be used for all
international cases. Although he thinks international choice of law should
be federalized, he sometimes suggests that the forum state’s choice of law
rules—including the rules of First Restatement states—will usually be
incorporated into this federal law. The forum state’s rules will be used, “not
because of compulsion under Erie and Klaxon but because so doing does
not thwart federal objectives.”77

74

Indeed, later the Supreme Court came to such a conclusion. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 512–13 (1988).
75
Childress, supra note 1, at 1569–79.
76
Id. at 1574, 1576.
77
Id. at 1574. That Childress is speaking of state choice of law rules being incorporated into
federal common law in this passage is strongly suggested by his citation of Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991), and Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497 (2001). Incorporation into federal common law occurred in both cases. Childress, supra note 1, at
1574 n.319.
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Under this reading, Childress is not recommending a wholesale change
in the choice of law rules used in international cases. His point is instead
that the rules that are used should be reconceptualized. State rules will be
used, in both state and federal courts, only because they have been
incorporated into federal common law.
The incorporation of state law into federal common law is a frequent
phenomenon.78 For example, because state laws are drafted with an eye to
local conditions, federal courts sometimes incorporate state standards into
federal law because doing so allows the content of the federal law to adapt
to conditions in the state.79 Using state standards can also avoid the
confusion that an independent federal standard would produce among
citizens who are accustomed to their state’s laws.80 State standards can even
be used for the simple reason that, being relatively well developed,
borrowing them allows federal courts to avoid the difficult and uncertain
work of articulating a uniform federal rule for the first time.81
But Childress does not explain why state choice of law rules should be
incorporated into federal common law. As he describes it, state rules should
be used when “so doing does not thwart federal objectives.”82 This is
insufficient to justify incorporation. State law standards are not
incorporated into federal common law when their use does not thwart
federal objectives. They are incorporated when their use furthers federal
objectives. Consider a federal court that borrows state standards for a
federal law because state standards were drafted with an eye to local
conditions. This is rightly described as incorporation because using state
standards serves the interests standing behind the federal law by allowing
the law to adapt to local conditions.83 In contrast, consider Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.84 Although using Pennsylvania law did not frustrate federal
interests, Erie was not a case in which state law was incorporated into
federal common law. The reason is that using Pennsylvania law did not
further federal interests. Indeed, the notion that state law is incorporated
into federal common law whenever the use of state standards does not
frustrate federal interests threatens the very idea that state law ever applies
of its own force.85

78

For a discussion, see Green, supra note 7, at 1281–85; Field, supra note 7, at 958–60; and Paul J.
Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 808–10 (1957).
79
See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1946).
80
See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98–99; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956).
81
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979) (“[T]he readymade body of state
law [is adopted] as the federal rule of decision . . . .”).
82
Childress, supra note 1, at 1574.
83
See Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 328 U.S. at 208–09.
84
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85
See Green, supra note 7, at 1282–83; Field, supra note 7, at 973–77.
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My point is not that the distinction between state law being
incorporated into federal law and applying of its own force is suspect.86
There is a meaningful difference between the two. If state law applies of its
own force, the authority on the state law standard is the state’s supreme
court. In contrast, if federal law incorporates state standards, federal
courts—in particular the United States Supreme Court—are the authority
on the incorporated standard.87
It is precisely for this reason that Childress’s reconceptualization of
international choice of law would be so disruptive. Assume, for example,
that an international choice of law case is brought in state court in New
York. If New York’s choice of law rules were really incorporated into
federal common law, the New York court would be bound by how the
United States Supreme Court had interpreted New York’s rules. To refuse
to respect these interpretations would be a violation of its obligation under
the Supremacy Clause. The New York court could diverge from past
Supreme Court interpretations only if it thought the Supreme Court would
follow any new interpretation it adopted.88
Fortunately, such absurd consequences can be avoided by insisting
that state choice of law rules are incorporated into federal common law
only when their use furthers federal interests. And—to repeat—Childress
has not provided us with evidence that this occurs in a significant number
of cases.
The title of Childress’s article suggests that he seeks to reevaluate
whether the disparate set of principles that are commonly called “the Erie
doctrine” applies in international cases. As it turns out, his real focus is
narrower: whether Klaxon is binding on a federal court when choosing
between state law and the law of another nation. Although most of his
arguments fail to cast doubt on Klaxon in such cases, one argument based
on the example of Sabbatino does meet its mark. When a state’s choice of
86

For a discussion of such skepticism, see Green, supra note 7, at 1282.
See id. at 1281–82; Field, supra note 7, at 964; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405–22 (1964). I emphasize the United States
Supreme Court because of uncertainty concerning whether state courts have a duty to abide by lower
federal courts’ interpretations of federal law. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but
neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s
interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2005).
88
Of course, Childress might be arguing that international choice of law is federalized in federal
court only. See supra note 44. If so, then it would be trivially true that any use of the forum state’s
choice of law rules would be due to incorporation into federal common law, since the forum state’s
rules cannot legitimately extend to federal courts. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. But under
such a reading, the analogy Childress draws with Sabbatino would be lost. Furthermore, incorporation
would be true in all choice of law cases faced by federal courts in diversity—including cases where the
federal court chooses between two states’ laws. Childress would no longer be able to claim that
international choice of law is distinctive.
87
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law approach would frustrate federal foreign policy interests, preemption
by a federal common law choice of law rule is appropriate. What is missing
in Childress’s article is a reason to think that federal preemption would
occur beyond a narrow set of cases like Sabbatino.
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